REPORTED CASES
Green v. Scurto Cement Constr., Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 2d 854
As to their 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 discrimination claim, plaintiffs alleged that (1) they were in a protected class, (2) they were qualified for the work they sought, (3) the union denied them that work and (4) the union gave the work to similarly situated people who were not members of the protected class. In this matter, where defendant sought dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the allegations sufficed for a prima facie case of racial discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. Moreover, if that was enough at the evidentiary stage of a lawsuit, it certainly enabled plaintiffs to get past the pleading stage.
Kimber Baldwin Designs, LLC v. Silv Communs., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 3d 670
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim that defendant telecommunications carrier violated 47 U.S.C.S. § 258’s “anti-slamming” provision when it caused plaintiff’s long distance provider to be changed to itself by falsely representing that plaintiff consented to the change, because subscribers injured by slamming were not required to present such claims to the FCC, but could file a civil action under § 258 against the slamming carrier. An unjust enrichment claim was not precluded by Ohio’s “voluntary payment doctrine” because plaintiff alleged defendant procured the payments through fraud, an exception to that doctrine. The complaint adequately alleged damages as an amount equal to the difference between what plaintiff paid for long distance service before being slammed and the excessive fees defendant charged it thereafter.
Lohmann v. City of Cincinnnati, 2018-Ohio-2505
In "Lohmann v. City of Cincinnati, 2018-Ohio-2505," three employees were improperly denied the opportunity to sit for a Civil Service examination based on a deficiency in the wording of the application for the examination.
Berkheimer v. REKM, LLC, 2018-Ohio-2668
Where plaintiff filed a tort suit alleging that he was injured after he ingested a bone in a chicken wing he ordered and consumed at defendant’s restaurant. The trial court erred by dismissing his case at the pleading stage under Civ.R. 12(C) because material facts remained undetermined. The complaint provided minimal detail identifying the chicken product allegedly consumed by defendant. Allen requires the court to consider the specific facts of the case in determining whether a consumer can reasonably anticipate and guard against eating an injurious object in a meat dish. The trial court lacked the facts necessary to determine beyond doubt that plaintiff could prove no set of facts that might entitle him to relief.
Estate of Mennett v. Stauffer Site Servs., LLC, 2020-Ohio-4355
Where, after construction managers ordered that work digging a trench stop because the trench was unsafe, a worker returned to the trench after the work-stop order was issued and died when the trench collapsed and buried him. The company was not liable under R.C. 2745.01 because the death was not caused by any specific intent to cause injury by the company since, once the work-stoppage order was issued and safety measures were sought, the company demonstrated a conscious regard for employee safety. Further, no order was issued to return to work, and speculation that the decedent must have reentered the trench to retain his employment was wholly unsupported by evidence. Plus, there was evidence establishing why the decedent was in the trench at the time of the collapse.
Harmon v. City of Cincinnati, 2023-Ohio-788
Trial court had jurisdiction under R.C. 2506.01 over employees’ appeal from a city civil service commission’s decision because the employees were not given a hearing on the city’s decision to lay them off under Ohio Civ. Serv. R. 17 despite notices of appeal as to procedural aspects of their layoffs alleging a violation of Ohio Civ. Serv. R. 12, and requesting a hearing, which required the commission to give the employees a hearing. The commission could not sua sponte decide that the leave was not a layoff prior to holding a hearing, and its denial of the hearing was an adjudication from a quasi-judicial proceeding giving the trial court jurisdiction. Because the employees’ CBA expressly preserved their rights to an individual claim as to an adverse employment decision not covered in the CBA, the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction under R.C. 4117.10(A).